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The Issue of European Civil Codification
and Legal Scholarship: Biases, Strategies
and Developments
By UGO MATTEI*

The question of the desirability and feasibility of a European
Civil Code is now on the table of scholarly debate in Europe. In this
essay I will use two approaches to comparative legal scholarship to
deconstruct some of the issues behind this debate: the common core
approach' and comparative law and economics!
This essay is clearly located in the world of the ought to be. It
has an openly normative rather than a positive flavor. It is more of
an essay in the domain of policy rather than a paper strictly confined
to the domain of professional law. Nevertheless, a focus on the relationship between the common core approach and comparative law
and economics offers a very interesting opportunity to
3 discuss some
basic positive aspects of comparative legal scholarship.
I will open with a critical discussion of some of the more impor* Alfred and Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Comparative Law,
Hastings College of Law, University of California; Professore Ordinario di Diritto
Civile, Universita' di Torino, Italy.
1. On this approach, see PIERRE BONASSIES ET AL, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS:
A

STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS

(Rudolf B. Schlesinger ed.,

1968). See also Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to
EuropeanPrivateLaw, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339 (1997).
2. See UGO MATrEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997); Ugo Mattei
& Fabrizio Cafaggi, Comparative Law and Economics, in THE NEw PALGRAVE: A
DICrIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 346-51 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Ugo
Mattei et al., Comparative Law and Economics, in INTERNATIONAL ENcYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (1998).
3. Measurement of analogies and differences between legal systems is the aim
of comparative law as a science. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic
Approach to ComparativeLaw, 39 AM. J. COMiP. L. 1 (1991-1992); P.G. Monateri &
Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Fomzants, in THE NEW PALoRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 531-33 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see also RUDOLF B.
SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW (5th ed. 1988).
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tant professional approaches to the issue of codification. I will explore briefly their political biases and hidden political agendas. I will
then focus on transaction costs to show the areas and the domains in
which European codification is cost-justified. I will conclude with
some remarks on the relationship between efficiency and common
core analysis, demonstrating where we are, in comparative law, on
the path to measurement of analogies and differences.
I. The Conservative Strategy
Since I openly take the normative ground, the distinction between legal and political discourse is rather thin. Indeed the very
word policy, as opposed to politics, is absent in almost all leading languages, other than English, spoken outside of the common law tradition.4 The question then follows: as a matter of political preference,
would I rather support codification, or would I rather be against it?
Whatever the answer might be, I believe that a pseudo-scientific
attitude towards this question is not only sterile but also dangerous
for legal scholarship. The Savigny-Thibaut opposition in nineteenth
century Germany with the former opposing codification and the latter favoring it itself had a strong political stake: Savigny's historical
approach representing a thoroughly ethno-centric, conservative,
class-privileged, self-serving attitude This same attitude and conservative politics, is today reflected by Professor Reinhard Zimmermann6 and some of his followers who, by the use of biased historiography, pursue a defense of the status quo in the professional-legal
leadership in Europe The only difference is that while Savigny
4. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT (1995).
5. For a brilliant discussion on the use of biased historiography as a strategy in
the Western Legal Tradition, see P.G. Monateri, Black Gaius, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
(forthcoming 1999).

6. Professor Reinhard Zimmermann has been quite prolific in repeating his
point after the great success of his book, THE LAW OF OBLIGATION: ROMAN
FOUINDATIONS OFTHE CIVILIAN TRADITION (1990). See, e.g., Reinhard Zimmerman,
Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 65
(A.S. Hartkamp et al. eds., 1994); Reinhard Zimmerman, Usus Hodiernus Pandec.
tarum, in EUROPAISHE RECHTS UND VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE: ERGEBNISSE UND
PERSPEKTIVEN DER FORSCHUNG 61 (Reiner Schulze ed., 1991); Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Code or Civil Law? Towards a New European Private Law, 20
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 217 (1994); Reinhard Zimmerman, Roman and ComparativeLaw: The European Perspective,16 J. LEG. HIST. 21 (1995).
7. On the decline of German leadership in legal studies, see Ugo Mattei, Why
the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 43 AM. J. COMp. L. 199
(1994).
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feared the hegemony of the French codification, Professor Zimmermann seems to fear the hegemony of U.S. legal culture and the challenge of different voices within European legal culture.
As a strategy, constructing the issue of civil codification as nonpolitical, technical and neutral helps maintain the present balance of
power in European legal leadership with historical and traditional
French and German leadership. With the growth of comparative
studies and the rise of the common law after World War II, major attention is now devoted to England. This pattern of legal leadership
thus corresponds to the political one, itself unbalanced in favor of
these three Member States. Stressing the common, historical legal
path of all the European legal systems makes the mentioned three a
natural focal point. Consequently, the pattern of political leadership
becomes culturally justified. Moreover, between Germany, France
and England the comparative advantage of the first is obvious.
France lost hegemony within the civil law at least a century ago, and
English legal culture, surrounded as it is by civil law countries and
being historically weak and overshadowed by the United States
within the common law world, certainly is not a strong competitor to
German cultural hegemony."
The effort of creating a code would have a disruptive impact on
this status quo. Politically, it would be impossible not to involve
scholars from all of the Member States. It would then become obvious that today a number of legal cultures other than the leading ones
(and traditionally overshadowed by the leading ones) are more advanced and cosmopolitan; and that, after all, "differences" are still
very important. Moreover, if the issue of codification would revert to
its obvious political nature, then a number of patterns in academic
hegemony would become much less influential. The political connections necessary to become members of the drafting committees would
become more important in determining academic success than connections within prestigious publishing companies and international
academies. Consequently, it is likely that the European academic
nomenklatura might also be sociologically shaken, with a necessary
and much larger involvement of members of marginal legal cultures,
different professional elites and different sociological groups (gender
difference included).
All of this can be avoided if the issue of codification is constructed as academic and if it is maintained within a highly homoge8. See id.
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neous European legal academic elite (a sort of old boys club) who,
rather appealingly, argue to close the gates and defeat the Bruxelles
Eurocrats. However, the real agenda is different. In avoiding the
political process, which is less homogeneous and more pluralistic than
legal academia, some legal scholars are more likely to keep their role
of hidden law givers.
Although hidden behind the technically innovative idea of the
reaction against the positivistic blend of national state law, the success of this politically conservative agenda, a thoroughly elitist academic "professional project" to keep the market, in the sense of sociologist Magali Sarfatti Larson," is itself revealing of a genuinely and
intrinsically conservative attitude of the legal profession at large. 1
Think for a moment what the reaction would be in the domain of
language (a domain with strong structural analogies with that of
law) 2 if someone would propose, without joking, that in order to facilitate communication between the people of Europe (a clearly practical need), Latin rather than English should become the common
language. Such a proposal is the perfect counterpart of Professor
Zimmermann's attempt to use, once more, the authority of Roman
law to cope with the fear of the "Americanization" of European law.
Only lawyers can take such an idea seriously. In any other domain, it would be considered as a sort of reactionary utopia. Professor Zimmermann's attitude goes so far as to suggest that the common
law is nothing more than a modernized (and corrupted) evolution of
Roman law. 3 Today, his view is not only taken seriously but is a
standard reference that frames the very terms of the debate. Since,
however, the questions asked determine the answers given, such acquiescence calls for a critical reaction. Openly acknowledging the
political nature of the choice between code and no code and the
stakes behind it is a crucial point that must be made for the sake of
9. See Antonio Gambaro, Il Successo del Giurista [The Jurist'sSuccess], in FORO
ITALIANO V (1983).
10. See MAGALI SARFATrI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALIsM: A
SOCIOLOGIcAL ANALYsis (1977).
11. See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism
and InternationalGovernance,1997 UTAH L. REV. 545.
12. The analogy between the political use of linguistics and that of comparative
law is fascinatingly discussed by Monateri, supra note 5.
13. Possibly attracted by the success that in academic circles follows exaggeration, Professor Zimmermann made this point in Der Europiiishe Carakter des englischen Recht. Historische Verbindungen zwischen civil law und common law, 1993
ZEITRIFr FOR EUROPAJSCHES PRivATREcHT 4.
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intellectual honesty and critique.
History is a serious matter. Everybody should be aware of it and
certainly the contribution of Roman law to English common law
must not be neglected."' Nevertheless, some Roman law scholars
tend to be extremely aware of the contribution of Roman law to different contexts but deeply unaware of the debts that Roman law contracted with other legal experiences. They tend to look at their subject matter as a model. Consequently, one should beware of
historical research that is based on a biased attitude showing what
was given but not of what was received." A good attitude is to leave
history to those professional historians who do not have a stake to
defend. It is therefore interesting to see one of the world's leaders of
the field Professor Paolo Grossi's reaction to the discussion of the
anti-codification movement's use of history:
I do not look at the past as a depository of models for today. Might
God restrain us from doing so! The historian should not propose
models, because he has no models among the tools he uses in
search for knowledge. I'm terrified when some modem Roman law
scholar digs out of his magician's hat obsolete Roman law tools in
the secret (and sometimes also open) hope to conquer a title of
honor in the building of the future uniform European law and to
gain a right of citizenship in the future European paradise. Think
about the large amount of essays written by Reinhard Zimmermann, a respectable colleague from the University of Regensburg
who likes to talk about Usus hodiernuspandectarurm. All of this is
appalling to me. As an historian, although limited by the great
modesty of my scholarship, I have learned the great truth that everything has its time. Today we are called upon to build with our
own energies the tools that we need. 6

This is the historian's advice that I would like to follow.

II. Fears of Hegemony
One of the main motivations behind the idea of the usits hodiernus pandectarumis the fear of U.S. hegemony. International political
14. I try, myself, to avoid this mistake in my book. See UGO MATrI, Co.to\,N
LAw 41 (1992).

15. See Monateri, supra note 5.
16. Paolo Grossi, Il Punto e la Linea: L' impatto degli studi storicinellaformazione del giurista [The Point and the Line: The Impact of HistoricalStudies in the Editcation of the Lawyer], in L' INSEGNAMENTO DEL Dirrrro OGi 264 (Rebuffa & Visintini eds., 1996) (translation by the author).
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scientist Susan Strange points out how today, globalization means
Americanization.17 The fear of globalization (or perhaps the lack of
attention to it) and the preservationist attitude towards a given cultural model (perceived as weak and in need of protection) seems to
be behind another brand of criticism to European codification, and
perhaps more generally to codification as an anti-pluralist tool. I refer to the position taken by Professor Pierre Legrand in a few papers,
some targeting the prospect of a European code and others the new
Quebec Civil Code.
I have to confess political sympathies to this agenda that considers the attempt of imposing legal unity by political power arrogant
and tries to preserve cultural diversity as a value. 9 Despite this sympathy, I must devote a few critical remarks. First, one should point
out that although Professor Legrand openly acknowledges his political agenda, he argues, in technical terms, an extreme form of interpretative approach that is mostly borrowed from a philosophical cultural criticism and is ill-equipped for application to the rather
practical needs of legal discourse.' The impossibility of "neutral
translations," the unavoidably civilian blend in the very idea of codification and the necessary change of the received pattern in case of
legal transplants are certainly important aspects that should be considered in multicultural exercises such as the drafting of transnational
law or a code to be used by different interpretive communities.
However, these issues do not preclude the development of culturally
aware legal tools able to serve their purpose in different contexts.
Another problem with Professor Legrand's argument is the
rather narrow context in which it is applied. Indeed, if one takes a
global perspective, the issue of cultural awareness and the arrogance
of worldwide cultural imperialism is something that affects the whole
17. See SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE (1996).
18. See Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44
(1997); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 45 INT'L &
CoMp. L.Q. 52 (1996).
19. See generally PAOLO GROsSI, L' ORDINE GIURIDICO MEDIEVALE [THE

MEDIEVAL LEGAL ORDER] (1996) (criticizing this arrogant attempt by state-centric
legal positivism).
20. I discuss the needs of positive scholarship and the difficulty of comparative
law in being a completely interpretive exercise in MATrEi, COMPARATIVE LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 3. See also DIRITrO, GIUSTIZIA E INTERPRETAZIONE
[LAW, JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION] (Mauro Bussani et al. eds., forthcoming 1999)

(including essays by legal scholars such as Rodolfo Sacco, Antonio Gambaro, P.G.
Monateri, Stefano RodotA, Ugo Mattei, Mauro Bussani and philosophers Gianni
Vattimo, Maurizio Ferraris and Jacques Derrida).
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Western legal tradition."' Consequently, the internal competitive relationship between the common law and the civil law is probably not
the arena in which such problems are more politically disturbing.=
Without the global dimension, the whole argument for the need
to protect the common law from the imperialism of the civil law (the
European code) weakens. Actually, for the reasons discussed in the
previous section, the need to protect the politically weak part of
European legal culture should argue for codification rather than the
other way around.
According to economists and common sense, all changes have a
cost. Again the parallel with building a new language is helpful. Despite the very successful counterexample of Hebrew, there is no question that if one language was chosen for all of Europe, there would be
enormous economies in using English over any other language (including French and German, let alone Latin!). The reason is not only
the obvious one, that many people already use it, but also that there
are clear advantages of English in international communication and
worldwide globalization. English today can be used for transactions
outside of Europe much better than any other European language.
Analogously, the attempt to create one legal order for Europe
should not be an exercise concerned only with European needs but
should be approached from a global perspective. In building the new
European order, we should consider that the stake is global and, consequently, the relationship with U.S. law and non-Western legal cultures cannot be ignored. Indeed the change of worldwide legal leadership from Germany to the United States, for the first time after
World War II, from the civil law to the common law, is a historical
event. Some nostalgics might dislike it, but it is a fact that only can
be ignored at very high social costs.2
This is why some other objections to codification expressed by
Professor Legrand from a completely different political perspective
than that of Professor Zimmermann, and certainly outside of
21. See Laura Nader & Elisabetta Grande, Current Illusions and Delusions
About Conflict Management, in TRADITIONAL AFRICAN CONFLICT MEDICINE (V.

Zartman ed.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the U.C. Berkeley, Dep't of Anthropology).
22. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the
World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMp. L. 5 (1997).

23. The argument is made plainly by the German scholar, Wolfgang Wiegand.
See Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception ofAmerican Law in Europe,39 AMt. J. COMP.
L. 229 (1991).
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hegemonic desires, are also weak. 4 Indeed, the fear that codification
would introduce a pattern of law excessively civil law oriented and
consequently disruptive of the cultural identity of common law attorneys does not take into account the major cultural impact of U.S. law
in today's worldwide legal scholarship. From a global perspective,
the trend seems more towards the Americanization-globalization of
European (and not only European) law rather than the other way
around. In this broader scenario, the comparative advantage of
England because of its language and legal culture similarities is too
obvious to stress.
It is also questionable whether the code could properly be considered a purely civilian, European tool. In a forward-looking exercise in social engineering like the building of a common law of
Europe, one should consider that the code is a rather recent and superficial civilian contribution to the general development of a Western legal tradition. This tradition' is deeply characterized by the existence of some strong and independent professional checks on the
process of social decision making. Today, strong independent judiciaries (common law) and strong independent universities (civil law)
are aspects at play almost everywhere in the Western legal tradition
(certainly in the United States) and hence become paradigmatic of it.
Consequently, the code, which is not absent from the common law
(and many of the proposals of European codification are today significantly restricted to matters that are codified in the American
UCC), can be considered a modern tool belonging to the whole
Western legal tradition as a legal organization characterized by the
hegemony of professional law.26 The technical desirability of such a
tool should be evaluated pragmatically, outside of cultural fears. The
final decision, as already mentioned, can and will be taken only on
political grounds.
I. Transaction Costs
In this section I will attempt to follow Professor Grossi's advice
to be conscious about the past, but to work out our tools for the future independently. Comparative law and economics helps in this direction.
24. See Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, supra note 18.

25. See Antonio Gambaro, Western Legal Tradition, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A

DICrIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 3.
26. See Mattei, supra note 22.
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Until recently, economics and law and economics were affected
by a clearly abstract and anti-historical approach. Within the neoinstitutional approach to economic science however, Nobel laureate
Douglass North and a large number of followers repeatedly assert
that "history matters. ' Moreover, the idea of the legal tradition as a
phenomenon of the "path dependence" of its professional actors
(judges, practitioners and professors) is central to comparative law
and economics, which has inherited the notion that comparison involves history.2
I will approach, from the comparative law and economics perspective, the following questions?
(1) When and why is a European Code desirable?
(2) What kind of rules or principles should be reflected in the
code?
The so-called "subsidiarity principle" clearly provides that reliance upon a European code would be justified and permissible only
where local law fails to obtain the results that one hopes to obtain by
means of a European code.' To give some content31 to this vague idea,
I will use the economic notion of transaction costs.
According to neo-institutional economists, the purpose of legal
institutions, both formal (such as codes) and informal (such as the
development of a legal culture), is to reduce transaction costs?2
Transaction costs are, generally speaking, all those costs that preclude or reduce the possibility of smooth market transactions. Resources that could be invested in productive, wealth maximizing ac27. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1991).

28. See sources cited supra note 3; see generally BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING
RETURNs AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994).
29. The section is based on Ugo Mattei, A Transaction Cost Approach to tile
European Civil Codes, 5 EuR. J.PRIv. L. 537 (1997).
30. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331 (1994). For a law
and economics perspective, see Roger Van Den Bergh, The Subsidiarity Principlein
European Community Law:
Some Insights from Law and Economics, 1
MAA
CHT J. EUR. & Comp. L. 337 (1994); Horst Siebert, The HarmonisationIssue
in Europe: PriorAgreement or Competitive Process, in THE COMPLETION OF THE
INTERNAL MARKEr 55 (Horst Siebert ed., 1990); Horst Siebert & Michael J.Koop,
InstitutionalCompetition: A Conceptfor Europe?, 1990 AUSSERWIRTsHAFr 45.
31. On this approach to law and economics, see NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN
G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST MODERNISM 130

(1997).
32. See NORTH, supra note 27.
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tivities are absorbed by transaction costs and consequently diverted
from their purpose. For example, in the absence of a reliable legal
system to enforce contracts, the party called to perform second has
an incentive to act opportunistically and not perform.: She has already received her benefit, so why should she pay consideration for
it? In the absence of a legal system, parties will spend substantial energy to monitor and fend off such opportunistic behavior. For example, parties will contract only with people whose reputation they
know. Alternatively, parties may introduce more or less inefficient
forms of self-help (exchange of hostages, etc.).
The legal system works to reduce, or even eliminate, this kind of
transaction costs. As a consequence, the parties will be able to contract more freely and will be less inclined to devote resources to
monitoring their transactions because the legal system is sufficiently
robust to protect them. As a result, more wealth-maximizing exchanges will occur and resources, rather than being used to create the
institutional conditions for a contract to work, will be invested in the
main productive activity." The legal system is justified only to the extent that it is cheaper to develop and maintain by means of the State
rather than by having parties work out their own private working institutional system by investing in measurement (selection of who to
contract with) or self-enforcement. In other words, if the formal legal system (rather than private informal arrangement) is a better device to reduce transaction costs, it is justified and cost effective. 5
This same model can be applied to the issue of the European
civil code in order to give concrete meaning to the subsidiarity principle: If the European civil code is a cost-justified device to reduce
transaction costs of the European market, it should be adopted. If it
is not, the project should be dropped. In other words, the code is justified if it reduces transaction costs, if it frees for productive purposes
resources that are presently spent in measuring and monitoring
transactions. The scholar's task, in order to answer the question of
whether the European Union should adopt a code, is to map the institutional costs and benefits of codifying and to compare them, from
the perspective of transaction costs reduction, with alternative options (e.g. maintain the status quo; enact a few directives; provide
33. See ROBERT COOTER & THoMAs ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 161 (2d ed.
1996).
34. See EDWARD E. ZAJAC, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 48(1995).
35. See NORTH, supra note 27, at 27.
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some kind of restatement, etc.).
The costs connected with the status quo (no European civil
code) are easy to detect. They are mainly in the form of information
costs. In a single community transaction where several legal systems
may be involved, arguably excessive diversity creates unpredictability
and requires a specialized bar. As a consequence, a significant share
of business resources must be devoted to specialized practitioners
who can give transactional and litigation assistance, rather than to investing in wealth maximizing activities. I focus on practitioners in
order to clearly reject normative claims such as those advanced by
Professor Basel Markesinis in the recent symposium on codification
hosted in Den Haag by the Dutch Ministry of Justice. According to
this scholar, rather than codify, the European Union should simply
train an elite of truly European practitioners. The high fees of an
elite bar (likely to be a significant percentage of each transaction) offer a concrete example of some of the transaction costs in the present
situation. Since all participants, particularly small businesses, cannot
afford this expensive advice, these high transaction costs give unfair
advantages to large businesses-a political problem in European society.
I will not spend time here on the theoretical arguments that: (1)
diversity increases efficiency since it creates institutional competition; and (2) codification will not create uniformity in the absence of
a common interpretive community.' Both these arguments might be
true and should be considered in deciding whether a code is a cost-

LA

36. The argument is made by many scholars. See, e.g., L. Antoniolli Deflorian,
STRUTrURA ISTITUZIONALE DEL Nuovo DiRITo PRIvATo EUROPEO:

COMPETzIONE E CIRCOLAZIONE DI MODELLI [THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF

THE NEW EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAw:

LEGAL COMPETITION AND TRANSPLANTs]

(1996); Rodolfo Sacco, The System of European PrivateLaw: Premisesfor a European Code, in 1 ITALIAN STuDIES IN LAW 71 (Alessandro Pizzorusso ed., 1992); Nor-

bert Reich, Competition Betveen Legal Orders: A New Paradigmof E.C. Law, 29
COMMON MKr. L. REv. 861 (1992). See generally UGO MATrEI, COMPARATIVE LAW
AND ECONOMICS 101 (1997).
37. This is the argument usually associated with the work of Reinhard Zimmer-

mann, supra note 6. A strong case against codification is also made by Hein Kbtz.
See, eg., Hein K6tz, ComparativeLegal Research: Its Function in the Development of
Harmonized Law: The European Perspective, in TOWARDS UNIVERSAL LAW:
TRENDS IN NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (1995). The
argument can be graduated and goes from the Savigny inspired idea (it is too early to
codify because the common culture is not ripe) to the extreme version (by Pierre Legrand) that considers the differences between civil law and common law so wide that
they can never be overtaken because of the cultural interpretative gap.
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effective transaction costs reducing device.'
It seems to me that the "efficiency of diversity" argument is very
helpful in deciding which areas of the law to codify. On the other
hand, the "difference will stay anyway" argument is rather obscure,
counter-intuitive and sometimes even suspect, as are all technical arguments used to hide political agendas. Whether differences will persist or disappear depends on a number of factors that simply make it
impossible to assert such broad statements. A lot depends on the
quality and the semantic level of the code, on its capacity to codify
common understandings and on its ability to reflect the diversity of
the legal cultures that are at play in Europe today. Furthermore,
much depends on the process of codification, on whether the code is
an arrogant imposition from the top down or whether it is a development from the bottom up. Moreover, a lot depends on the areas of
the law that one is called to codify.
Obviously, a European Civil Code (a formal institutional arrangement) does not solve the problem of the need for informal institutions to lubricate it (the European interpretive community). The
common code and the common legal culture, far from being in contradiction with each other, seem to push in the same direction.
IV. Path Dependency
There is one general aspect of a new codification that is crucial
to consider in evaluating whether undertaking codification is a productive exercise. A new codification involves a change that has some
costs to everybody. Every lawyer faced with a change in the law has
to learn the new law, and becoming familiar with the change has its
costs. For an economist, these are also information costs that should
be compared with the benefits of codifying any given area of the law.
Every change in the law creates some losers and winners. What
makes things difficult is that losers and winners can be found at very
different levels of analysis.
To begin with, one can focus on national political communities.
From this perspective, potential codification losers are the beneficiaries of the political status quo, such as Germany (Zimmermann's research agenda has in fact received very prestigious and generous
German financial aid). There are also winners and losers within a
38. See supra text accompanying note 30; see also Christian Kirchner, A "European Civil Code": Potential, Conceptual, and Methodological Implications, 31 U.C.
DAvIs L. REv. 671 (1998).
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given national community and between professional and institutional
actors. For example, it is likely that Dutch professors would be winners in case of a new European codification. They are likely to be influential in creating the new European code because of their recent
experience in this domain. Moreover, Holland would gain from a
European legal earthquake (such as that created by a serious codification project) because, while its legal academy is very cosmopolitan,
its share of power and prestige is rather limited compared to France,
Germany and England. Nevertheless, because it is highly unlikely
that the European Civil Code will look exactly like (or even substantially like) the new Dutch Civil Code, Dutch practitioners who invested a lot of time in the new Dutch code and are reluctant enough
to changes in that code, will be worse off if faced with yet another
change in their routine. All of these are "professional" costs and
benefits, but they are just a few of the potential costs of codification.
There are other substantial cost issues such as the winners and losers
determined by the content of the new code.
Participants in the legal community tend to protect their own
heritage and niche of expertise. Due to this protectionism, there is a
danger of chauvinism within the legal community, or in adopting
economic jargon, "path dependency." This is an important notion
developed in neo-institutional economics&" According to this idea,
every organization adapts to its institutional setting by developing
behavioral and cognitive routines aimed at avoiding reconsideration
of the available choices over and over again. This pattern may be
adaptively efficient, when the costs of reconsidering the alternatives
(and of developing them within the institutional setting) are higher
than the discounted alternative path's benefits which are foregone by
following the approved routine. It might happen, however, that such
routines become sub-optimal, but the organization does not change
them. There are several reasons why sub-optimal routines are not
replaced by better alternatives: (1) the availability of the alternative
is simply ignored (menu dependency); (2) the costs of modifying the
institutional setting are wrongly perceived; or (3) the incentives to
change the institutional setting are wrongly aliocated in the given circumstances. ' Thus, as a consequence of path dependency, an organi39. See NORTH, supra note 27.
40. This idea is developed in UGO MATrEi, LEGAL SYSTEMS INDISTRESS: HIV
CONTAMINATED BLOOD, PATH DEPENDENCY AND LEGAL CHANGE (Olin Law and
Economics Working Papers, Boalt Hall, U.C. Berkeley, 1997); UGo MATrEI, THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AS AN ORGANISATION: UNDERSTANDING CHANGES IN COMMON
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zation will not change their routines regardless of the performance of
those routines essentially because of increasing returns.
Because of the tremendous complexity of the legal system, as an
aggregate of formal and informal institutions and as a legitimating
device of the lawyer's "professional project," every lawyer is fond of
his own routine and perceives global change as inefficient. In fact,
each lawyer, and particularly more innovative academics, do advocate some changes usually in the domain of formal institutions.
However, when we arrive at global changes that actually modify the
informal institutional setting (affecting the lawyer's mentalit6),
changes are feared or even considered impossible." This is what
makes the legal tradition, or as some might prefer, the style of a given
legal system, remarkably path dependent.
In the case of a civil codification of European law, the institutional change is perceived as broad and revolutionary enough to become a good example of the impact of path dependency on legal
change in general. Indeed, a European Civil Code not only is per se a
broad and ambitious exercise of formal institutional modification, but
it is also likely to affect the informal institutional setting as well (particularly within a mainly civilian constituency). A new code, drafted
and engineered in a completely different way from the old one, will
also likely affect a lawyer's way of thinking. The two big issues in the
recent history of civil codification in the civil law tradition are: (1)
whether there should be a general part; and (2) whether there should
be a separate commercial code.4" These are choices whose impact is
certainly not confined to the domain of formal institutions; indeed,
they deeply affect a lawyer's way of thinking and other mute professional assumptions.43
It is likely that the aggregate of fifteen different (perhaps locally
optimal) routines will be sub-optimal in international transactions.
Furthermore, the obvious way to modify institutions (when there is
political power to do so) is to begin modification with the formal institutions. Consequently, it is easy to predict that European codification will be resisted because of path dependency. Path dependency
makes it very difficult to reach agreement on most basic issues involved in the form of codification, let alone its substance.
(Olin Law and Economics Working Papers, Boalt Hall, U.C.
Berkeley, 1997).
41. See K6tz, supra note 37.
42. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 3.
43. See Rodolfo Sacco, Mute Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (1995).
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This last observation brings us to another fundamental question
I wish to address. What content would make the code transaction
costs effective? Because of path dependency, it is difficult even for
comparative legal scholars trained to look beyond their borders to
recommend something different from the local legal system with
which they are familiar.
It is interesting to note the behavior of the leading elite of European private lawyers at the mentioned Den Haag conference on
European civil codification.'
From Hamburg, Professor Ulich
Drobnig, a follower of the German Civil Code (BUrgerliches Gesetz
Buch) path, advocated a general part for the new code. From Paris,
Professor Dennis Tallon, a follower of the Napoleonic path, pointed
at the French Code as the semantic model for European codification.
Professor Basel Markesinis, more a follower of the English path than
an Englishman, recommended the Oxford model (where he teaches)
as a good way to approach the problem of European private lav outside of the need of codification. For several years now, Professor Giuseppe Gandolfi has not been ashamed of claiming the Italian code
(to which he is a follower) as the proper model, despite more than
one scholar's observation that the Italian code was born old and, on
top of it, its semantic level makes it a poor performer of the code's
job to provide a set of principles offering a centripetal scheme of interpretation.
Nor it is an unforeseeable surprise, for a politically cynical analyst of institutional behavior used to detect the potential winners and
of changes, that the Dutch government would be the one to give
momentum back to codification of European private law by sponsoring the Den Haag Conference. Indeed, the Dutch Civil Code is
the most recent and cosmopolitan code enactment in Western
Europe. It is in the best position to advocate its role as a model for
the West, Eastern Europe, Russia, Mongolia and other countries.
I do not believe that the scholarly debate on the need for the
European Civil Code should be spoiled by veiled agendas of cultural
hegemony. While the final decision on codification is bound to be
political, as scholars we should try to offer some (normative) guidelines for principled decision making other than the nationality and
stake of the participants in this game.

44. The papers of the conference are published in 5 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF

PRivATE LAW 455 (1997).
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V. The Common Core Approach
To begin with, let me say clearly that these "guidelines for principled decision making" cannot and should not try to be neutral.
There is a political game going on in Europe. Although the issue of
codification is certainly not the most important one, scholars must be
aware of it if they do not wish to give up their critical role. Scholars
working on the assumption that they can be neutral in this area, are
bound to offer only very limited contributions to the issue. A look to
the content of the two most important and acclaimed transnational
scholarly products in the domain of contract law should clarify what I
mean. Both the UNIDROIT principles45 and the first published outcome of the Lando Commission46 are useful pieces of work whose
domain and ambition are limited by their attempt to avoid every political choice, while striving to keep a neutral flavor.
Unfortunately, as it made clear by scholarship devoted to the
study of institutions, there is no such thing as an institutional vacuum,
because informal institutional arrangements and the market, the
most pervasive of all institutions, immediately fulfill whatever is not
politically decided as a formal institutional choice." As a consequence, avoiding political choices in the name of neutrality is itself a
political choice in favor of the strongest market actor. Since most
private law systems agree to use the market as the prevailing ruling
institution in areas of contract law, it is easy to stress this aspect in a
restatement or restatement-like enterprise. However, from a critical
perspective, it is easy to observe that the very notion of freedom of
contract is little more than a tautology in the sense that is has no
normative meaning other than deferring to the market as the ruling
institution. As a legal notion, therefore, it has no operative meaning.' Indeed, when the time comes to restate detailed rules of con45. See MICHAEL 'JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACT LAW:

THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL

CONTRACrS (1994).
46. See THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW:

PERFORMANCE, NON-PERFORMANCE AND REMEDIES

(Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1995).
47. See generally NORTH, supra note 27; FURBOTN-RICHTER, NEO INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS (1997); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ORGANIZATION THEORY (1990).

48. The point is very clearly made by a line of scholarship that certainly cannot
be considered politically radical. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 3; Rodolfo
Sacco, Legal Formants:A Dynamic Approach to ComparativeLaw, 39 AM. J. COMP.
L. 1 (1992) (explaining the need to look for operative rules rather than declamations).
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tract law rather than empty general statements around "freedom of
contract" or "good faith," different political choices taken by different legal systems become more difficult to conceal. Consequently, it
becomes difficult, even for a powerful argumentative device as neutrality, to hide political choices. As a result, such enterprises are limited and circumscribed in their scope.
The problem is that both the UNIDROIT Principles and the
Lando Commission offer restatements without having thoroughly
looked at the basic question that must be approached by every restatement, i.e. whether there is something common to be restated and
what it is.
Is there a European contract law in action to be restated? If the
restatement wishes to remain, as it declares, a "bottom-up" enterprise, it needs such knowledge. Without knowing whether there is a
European contract law to restate, it is hard to persuade a critical
reader of its coherence with its declared descriptive flavor of a professional, scholarly product and normative ambitions of enactment.
In theory, the necessity for a restatement is not necessary for a
code which is typically a "top-down" exercise of political power.
Nevertheless, looking at law as an aggregate of both formal and informal institutional arrangements shows that the very opposition between top-down (code) and bottom-up (restatement or common culture) is not clear cut. The function of institutions to reduce
transaction costs in order to increase economic performance must be
pursued by tackling both the formal and the informal aspects of
them."
In the particular domain of restatements and codes, philosophers, in general, and legal historians demonstrate that a completely
descriptive exercise is impossible. Economists teach the value of
knowing what is already out there as the existing institutional background on which a new code will be enacted. It is now part of the
general common sense that the questions asked determine the answers received.-" As a consequence, consciously or unconsciously, the
restatement projects in the United States have been interpretive,
hidden and normative exercises." Conversely, the civil codes, including the more ambitious and revolutionary ones, were never fully

49. See NORTH, supra note 27.
50. See HANs GEORG GADAMER, WAHRHErr UND METHODE (1960).
51. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 71 (1977).
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able to impose a completely new legal order." If "history matters" in
the search for the best possible institutional arrangements, the
knowledge of what is already out there as an institutional background
is crucial in proposing a "principled" content of a European Civil
Code that goes beyond the nationality and personal stakes of the decisionmakers involved.
As already discussed, legal change has a cost that is proportional
to the degree of its departure from previous routines. The more radical the change is to formal institutions, the more the developed informal routines will become adaptively sub-optimal, and the more
necessary it is to invest resources into changing all routines (formal
and informal). I submit that the best transaction cost reducing codification is the one that is able to verbalize and codify what is already
out there in common between as many of the member States as possible. This is what I would call the "common core" approach to codification.
While this is a rather simple recipe coming out of comparative
law and economics focusing on transaction costs (change as little as
possible in the local routines by keeping as much as possible of what
is already in common), there are two rather serious problems. First,
nobody knows what is already common in Europe today, despite talk
of a common history and the common period of the jus comune
Discovering common elements among European countries requires a
systematic and painstaking use of the factual approach, discussing
common practical problems and looking for their actual solutions in
all national legal systems. Of course, this must be done with the particular sensibility offered by the use of the most advanced tools of
comparative legal research, such as Rodolfo Sacco's "Legal Formants." ' 4 As Professor K6tz recently reminded the many scholars
that are today engaged in this ambitious enterprise within the Common Core of European Private Law Project in Trento; playing with
general principles and broad ideas of jurisprudence might make it
rather easy to find common aspects in European private law. Finding
the technical details might be more difficult, and the overall complexity of "common core" research might make it prohibitive."
52. See James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459
(1994).
53. See id.
54. This advice comes from Rudolf B. Schlesinger. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger,
The Pastand the Futureof ComparativeLaw, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 477 (1995).
55. Hein K6tz, The Common Core of European Private Law: Presented at the
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Second, it may be that, after undertaking serious common core
research, it turns out that there simply is no common core to codify
or restate in some areas of the law. Legal systems within Europe
genuinely diverge on a number of technical issues. In such cases,
principled, non-chauvinistic choices need to be made. Such choices
are political, but comparative law and economics might carry them
through political change. Using efficiency as a measurement device
for institutional effectiveness will let policy makers know the costs of
the choices they make. For example, efficiency analysis highlights
what set of incentives are created for different market actors when
penalty clauses are banned from contracts or when a contract is (or is
not) enforced under particular circumstances or under contract principles of fairness.
Of course, this is not an easy task to carry on in practice. We are
still far from knowing whether transaction cost reduction can actually
be used to bring comparative law beyond its present taxonomic phase
to a point where differences between alternative institutional arrangements actually can be measured. To be sure, in order to make
this kind of measurement in the complexity of the real world, not
only is there a lot of data collection to complete, but there is the need
to cope with the very problem that makes measurement more difficult in social sciences than in natural sciences: institutions never stand
to await measurement. They change at an incredibly fast rate so dynamic tools (still underdeveloped in economics) are needed. This,
however, goes beyond the scope of this paper concerned as it is with
the technologic problem of codification.
Developing the tools
needed to address these problems might, however, be the scholarly
payoff of working on the European civil codification project.
I believe that, hard as it might be, common core research is an
unavoidable prerequisite to reducing the transaction costs of the
codification of European private law. The research should provide
information about what is already common in the different European
legal systems, as a byproduct, it should stimulate the development of
a methodology shared by an international legal community, a crucial
informal aspect of the European institutional scenario.5' Common
core research may eventually lead to informed conclusions as to
whether European codification is a cost effective enterprise compatible with the subsidiarity principle.
Third General Meeting of the Trento Project,21
803 (1998).

56. See Bussani & Mattei, supra note 1.
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If a common core is not detected in one or more legal areas
(which is indeed very likely), codification may still be worthwhile because there may be an overall reduction in transaction costs in some
areas of the law. In this case I agree with Professor Gambaro that
comparative efficiency analysis of alternative institutional solutions
(rough as it might be in the present stage) might provide a powerful
tool to make efficient guesses for a cost effective European codification."

57. See MATMIE, supra note 36, at 97.

